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This study looks inside a large retail-banking group to understand how 
influence within the group affects internal capital allocations and 
lending behavior at the member bank level. The group consists of 181 
member banks that jointly own a headquarters. Influence is measured 
by the divergence from one-share-one-vote. We find that more 
influential member banks are allocated more capital from headquarters. 
They are less likely to decrease lending after negative deposit growth 
or to increase lending following positive deposit growth. These effects 
are stronger in situations in which information asymmetry between 
banks and the headquarters seems greater. The evidence suggests that 
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1. Introduction 
Capital allocation within a firm or a business group, while central to corporate finance, 
has not been widely studied, partly because data are hard to come by.
1 In this paper, we analyze a 
proprietary data set from a large retail-banking group to shed light on how the distribution of 
influence within this group is related to the allocation of group resources and the lending behavior 
of its member banks.  
The banking group consists of 181 member banks and a headquarters organization. The 
headquarters is jointly owned by the member banks and coordinates marketing and back office 
activities. More important, the headquarters is responsible for channeling internal funding 
surpluses and deficits among its member banks and is their only window to the external capital 
market. The member banks operate in a highly developed and competitive banking market that is 
homogeneous in terms of economic, social, and geographic particulars.
2  
Our data are from the group’s internal managerial accounting system and allow us to 
directly observe not only the lending and deposits of each member bank, but also all capital 
transfers between the group headquarters and the banks. Most important, the data allow us to 
create a measure of each bank’s influence within the group. Using this measure, we study how 
influence relates to (1) the capital transfers from the headquarters to the member banks; and (2) 
the sensitivity of a bank’s loan growth to its local deposit growth.
3 
A bank’s relative influence in the group is measured by the divergence from one-share-
one-vote. The measure is computed as the ratio of a bank’s share of voting rights divided by its 
share of ownership rights in the headquarters.
4 A member bank with more voting rights relative to 
its ownership rights is perceived as more influential because it can bargain for more favors 
relative to its ownership share. The ratio of voting rights to ownership rights is arguably 
exogenous to recent changes in investment opportunities or performance, as both voting and 
ownership rights were determined decades ago and did not change during the sample period. 
                                                 
1 Two recent exceptions are Gopalan et al. (2007), who consider intragroup loans in Indian business groups, 
and Glaser et al. (2009), who study the distribution of cash windfalls inside an industrial conglomerate. 
2  The name of the banking groups and the country of operation cannot be disclosed because of a 
confidentiality agreement. 
3 In measuring the sensitivity of loan growth to internal cash flow (i.e., deposit growth), we follow the 
recent literature (e.g., Campello, 2002, Houston et al., 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998). In light of the debate in 
the literature (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 2000; Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), we choose to be 
agnostic on whether a correlation of loan growth and deposit growth implies inefficiency in the internal 
capital market and focus instead on how the correlation varies with the influence of a bank. 
4 We will explain the measure in detail in Section 2.2. Similar measures have been used in the corporate 
governance literature. See, for example, Claessens et al. (2000), Doidge et al. (2005), Faccio and Lang 
(2002), Harvey et al. (2001), Kim (2004), La Porta et al. (1999), La Porta et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins 
(2003), Lins (2003), and Leuz et al. (2009).   3
Moreover, the ratio’s variation across banks is also caused by discontinuities in the structure of 
voting rights allocations (e.g., the number of votes can only be an integer between one and ten, 
while the number of shares is basically continuous). Influence and corporate politics is always 
subtle and tacit, but we can also describe some more formal examples. Banks can exercise 
influence at the headquarters by voting on the composition of the group’s supervisory board, 
which elects the banking group’s executive board and sets the general strategy of the group. 
Moreover, more influential banks are more likely to be represented in important committees at 
the headquarters, which decide on group policies and internal relations. 
Influence within the banking group may affect internal capital allocations and member 
bank lending through two different mechanisms. Influence can be used (1) to overcome 
information asymmetries between individual banks and the headquarters, and/or (2) to facilitate 
empire building by local member bank managers. We call the first mechanism the ‘information 
asymmetry’ hypothesis, and the second one the ‘empire building’ hypothesis. These two 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. In many organizations both mechanisms could co-exist 
and the question of which mechanism dominates therefore seems an empirical one. As we explain 
below, while both hypotheses predict that more influence should lead to more capital allocation, 
they have different empirical predictions on how influence should affect the sensitivity of a 
bank’s loan growth to its deposit growth.  
Among others, Harris et al. (1982), Antle and Eppen (1985) and Bernardo et al. (2001, 
2004) model information asymmetry within a firm as an essential friction of intra-firm resource 
allocation (see Rajan and Reichelstein, 2004, for a review of this literature). A general 
implication of those theories is that information asymmetry within a firm can lead to an under-
allocation of capital because headquarters is concerned that units may overstate their own 
investment opportunities. In our case, information asymmetry exists between the headquarters 
and the member banks regarding their true lending opportunities. This may lead to an under-
allocation of capital to member banks with good opportunities. More influential banks, however, 
may have better access to and better communications with headquarters, which may result in 
reduced information asymmetry and more allocations of capital. We call this the ‘information 
asymmetry’ hypothesis. 
However, in models by Meyer et al. (1992), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Rajan et al. 
(2000), and Wulf (2009), influence inside a firm may also be used to obtain larger capital 
allocations to satisfy empire building preferences. Empire building can have the purpose of 
controlling more resources, enjoying private benefits, or gaining status from running a larger 
bank. We call this the ‘empire building’ hypothesis.   4
While both hypotheses predict that more influential member banks may receive larger 
allocations of capital from the headquarters, they have different predictions on how banks should 
respond to positive and negative deposit growth. This difference allows us to disentangle the two 
hypotheses.  
If an influential member bank experiences negative deposit growth in its local market, 
both the empire building and information asymmetry hypotheses predict that the bank will try to 
use its influence to obtain more funding from headquarters to prevent its lending from declining. 
However, when an influential member bank experiences positive local deposit growth, the two 
hypotheses’ predictions diverge: the empire building hypothesis predicts that the bank would use 
its influence to try to keep the cash inflow to further increase its lending (see Blanchard et al., 
1994), whereas the information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that the bank would restrain from 
increasing lending as long as investment opportunities do not change. 
Therefore, the empire building hypothesis suggests that more influential banks show loan 
growth that is more sensitive to positive deposit growth and less sensitive to negative deposit 
growth. In contrast, the information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that influence is associated 
with a lower sensitivity of a bank’s lending to its internal cash flow for both positive and negative 
deposit growth. The latter happens as more influential banks are insulated from negative deposit 
growth (as they can better communicate their true lending opportunities), while, at the same time, 
unlike their less influential peers, they do not need to rely on the opportunities of positive deposit 
growth to increase lending.   
We can therefore summarize the above hypotheses as follows: 
H1 (‘Information Asymmetry’ Hypothesis): More influential banks receive more funds 
from headquarters, and their lending is less sensitive to the local deposit base for both negative 
and positive deposit growth.  
H2 (‘Empire Building’ Hypothesis): More influential banks receive more funds from 
headquarters, and they increase their lending more when experiencing positive deposit growth 
and decrease their lending less when experiencing negative deposit growth.  
The empirical predictions of the two hypotheses are summarized in Figure 1. In addition, 
we expect the empirical predictions to be stronger when information asymmetry between 
headquarters and the banks is greater, as influence may be more relevant in those circumstances. 
We will test both hypotheses against the null hypothesis that influence is unrelated to intra-firm 
capital allocations and the sensitivity of loan growth to deposit growth.  
In our empirical analysis, we document large and frequent internal loans to, and deposits 
from, member banks vis-à-vis headquarters. Net funds from headquarters partly compensate   5
member banks for lower deposit growth and are larger if investment opportunities are better.
5 We 
find that more influential banks are allocated more funds from headquarters: a one-standard-
deviation increase in influence is associated with net funds from headquarters (relative to total 
assets) that are higher by about 6.3%, which is more than one-half the cross-sectional standard 
deviation and about a third of the median ratio of net funds from headquarters relative to total 
assets. 
While member banks’ loan growth is higher for more productive banks with better 
opportunities, it also depends significantly on their own deposit growth. Thus, loan growth seems 
generally constrained by the local deposit base. While we cannot completely rule out that the 
correlation between loan growth and local deposit growth is partially driven by investment 
opportunities, our focus in this paper is on how this correlation varies across member banks with 
high versus low influence.  
We find that the loan growth of more influential banks is less sensitive to their own 
deposit growth. We document that more influential member banks are not only less likely to 
decrease lending after cash outflows (negative deposit growth), but are also less likely to increase 
lending when experiencing cash inflow (positive deposit growth). This latter finding seems 
inconsistent with the ‘empire building’ hypothesis. Rather, it supports the information asymmetry 
hypothesis, where less influential banks are more constrained by information asymmetry vis-à-vis 
headquarters and thus have to rely more heavily on positive deposit growth to increase their 
lending. Economically, a one-standard-deviation increase in influence is associated with a 
reduction of 0.066 in the sensitivity coefficient of loan growth to deposit growth, which is about 
one-quarter of the unconditional coefficient. Our results are robust to including region-by-time 
fixed effects, to including member bank fixed effects, to separately controlling for voting and 
ownership rights, and to interacting deposit growth with member bank size and different proxies 
of performance. In effect, the use of region-by-time fixed effects means that our results are 
obtained by comparing, in each time period, about a dozen member banks within narrowly 
defined geographic regions. 
We show that the effects of influence are stronger if there is greater potential for 
information asymmetry problems between the member banks and headquarters, for which we use 
several alternative proxies. First, we sort banks into high- and low-volatility deposit growth 
groups. High deposit volatility creates more volatile local funding deficits (funding gaps), leading 
                                                 
5   Net funds from headquarters are defined as the difference between loans from and deposits at 
headquarters. Gopalan et al. (2007) also used net funds in their analysis. Our results do not change if we 
look at gross funds (loans) from headquarters instead.   6
member banks to make more frequent requests for large funding support from headquarters. 
Unlike small funding requests, which are routinely approved, larger requests require direct 
communication and the provision of more information to committees at headquarters. Second, we 
use a member bank’s distance to the headquarters as a measure of information asymmetry (see, 
e.g., Degryse and Ongena, 2005, Landier, Nair, and Wulf, 2007, and Liberti and Mian, 2009). 
Finally, we separate business lending from personal lending. Business lending relies more on soft 
information (Stein, 2002), while personal lending in this banking group predominantly consists of 
residential mortgage loans with relatively more hard information. We assume that the 
transmission of hard information may be less affected by differences in influence and compare 
the sensitivity of loan growth to deposit growth between the two different loan products. Across 
all three measures, we find that influence is more important in reducing the sensitivity of loan 
growth to deposit growth when information asymmetry problems are likely to be more severe.
6  
A major challenge in the internal capital market literature is how to account for 
investment opportunities, which may differ across different parts of a firm (in our case across 
member banks) and may be correlated with deposit growth. However, several aspects of our 
empirical design allow us to mitigate such endogeneity concerns (explained in more detail in 
Section 2.3). First, the banks within the group are very homogeneous in terms of their business 
model, products, brands, and pricing policies. Second, we control for variations in local market 
conditions by employing region-by-time fixed effects that change each quarter.
7 Third, we also 
control for investment opportunities using the banking group’s own internal measure of member 
bank productivity, which is defined as income over costs. Fourth and finally, we exploit an 
exogenous event in 2007, which generated largely exogenous deposit inflows. This analysis also 
allows us to mitigate concerns that our influence measures proxies for unobserved productivity. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data 
and methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6 As an additional measure and for robustness, we also use in unreported regressions the age of a bank and 
assume that older and more established banks have a longer track record and are less exposed to 
asymmetric information vis-à-vis headquarters. While a limitation of this analysis is that most banks in the 
sample are relatively old, we still find that our results are robust to using this proxy for information 
asymmetries. 
7   Our results are also robust to further adding bank fixed effects, accounting for time-invariant 
heterogeneity at the bank level.   7
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Funding Sources and Lending Activities of Member Banks 
The group consists of 181 member banks that jointly own a headquarters organization, 
which is responsible for internal and external financing activities, as well as marketing and some 
back office activities. The government has no ownership or direct involvement in the group. All 
banks of the group have an identical business model and brand, identical products and marketing, 
and identical pricing schedules. Specifically, all member banks offer the same rates for deposits 
and follow the same reference rates for loans to customers. Finally, each member bank is 
mutually owned by its local depositors. The managing director (whose role is similar to that of a 
CEO) of each member bank is appointed by a supervisory board that is elected by the small and 
dispersed depositors. The banks’ stated goal is to maximize value for their members, disbursing 
regular profit-sharing dividends to them and serving their financial interests. 
  Member banks have three sources of funding: local deposits, retained earnings, and 
headquarters funding (i.e., internal capital allocations). The funding from headquarters arrives in 
the form of internal loans, on which all banks pay the same interest rates regardless of their risk 
levels. Member banks cannot access the external capital market themselves, nor are they allowed 
to invest their cash surpluses outside the group. Member banks can invest their funds either in 
loans to customers in the local market or deposit surplus funds at headquarters.  
Headquarters has excellent access to the external capital markets, as evidenced by its top 
credit rating and continued access to money markets during the recent global credit crisis. 
Lending at the aggregate group level, as shown in Figure 2, is largely unrelated to fluctuations in 
aggregate deposits. This suggests that headquarters seems to be able to smooth out group-level 
funding shortages by tapping the external capital market. A correlation between loan and deposit 
growth at the member bank level may thus suggest that possible frictions are more likely to come 
from the internal capital allocation process r than from frictions between headquarters and the 
external capital market.  
 
2.2 Measuring Member Bank Influence 
We use information on the voting and ownership rights of each member bank in the 
headquarters to construct a proxy for a bank’s influence within the group. A member bank’s 
relative ‘influence’ is defined as the bank’s voting rights share in the headquarters divided by its 
ownership rights share. Therefore, a member bank is considered more influential if it holds more 
voting rights relative to its ownership rights. Using the divergence from one-share-one-vote to 
measure disproportionate influence is common in the corporate governance literature, which   8
generally finds that voting rights in excess of ownership rights are associated with private benefits 
(see, e.g., Claessens, et al., 2000, Doidge et al., 2009, Faccio and Lang, 2002, Harvey et al., 2001, 
Durnev and Kim, 2004, La Porta et al., 1999, 2002, Lemmon and Lins, 2003, Lins, 2003, and 
Leuz et al. 2009).  
Influence and corporate politics is always subtle and tacit. A more formal example is that, 
through their voting rights, member banks can have influence at headquarters and decide, among 
other things, on the composition of the group’s supervisory board, which elects the banking 
group’s executive board and sets the general strategy of the banking group. The voting rights 
distribution is shown in Figure 3. With a total number of votes in the group equal to 1,165 and the 
maximum number of votes of a member equal to 10, even the largest bank has less than 2% of the 
overall voting rights. Therefore, our influence proxy should not be interpreted as meaning overall 
dominance, but rather greater influence within the organization relative to a given ownership 
share.
8  
The ratio of voting rights to ownership rights seems exogenous to recent changes in 
investment opportunities for at least two reasons. First, the voting rights structure in this banking 
group was shaped many decades ago. The allocation of headquarters funds to the member banks 
was not an important concern in the past, since most local banks had more deposits than lending 
opportunities (i.e., internal transfers from headquarters to the members were generally not 
needed). The imbalance between deposits and lending at both the local and the aggregate level 
and the reliance on the interbank market are rather recent phenomena. Similar changes occurred 
in other industrialized countries as well. In the US, for example, the commercial banking sector’s 
loan volume exceeded deposit volume for the first time at the turn of 21
st century. It is therefore 
unlikely that internal capital allocations were a major consideration when the voting structure was 
envisioned and votes/shares allocated decades ago. Neither voting nor ownership rights change in 
our sample period.  
Second, a lot of the variations in the ratio of voting rights over ownership rights are 
caused by the discontinuous nature of the voting rights numbers. Irrespective of the number of 
shares a bank owns, the smallest member banks with the lowest numbers of shares are given at 
least 1 vote while the largest member banks with the highest numbers of shares are assigned at 
                                                 
8 The US Senate may provide an imperfect but still useful analogy illustrating the idea behind our measure. 
With only about 0.2% of the US population, the state of Alaska can elect two senators to the 100-member 
US Senate. With a 2% vote share in the Senate, Alaska certainly cannot be considered as having dominant 
control. However, it may enjoy influence disproportionate to its size because its support can be won over 
with a smaller favor (which, however, can be substantial relative to its smaller economy or population size) 
than what, for example, the much more populous California would ask for.   9
most 10 votes. Moreover, since fractional votes are not possible, a member bank whose 
ownership rights (which is basically a continuous variable) narrowly qualifies her for 7 votes 
would control the same voting rights as another bank, whose larger number of shares would 
almost qualify her for 8 votes.  
Ownership rights allow member banks to share the profits and losses of the headquarters 
activities. When voting rights and ownership rights diverge, a bank may not internalize all of the 
consequences of an internal capital allocation decision. Therefore, a value of the influence 
variable, i.e., the ratio of voting rights to ownership rights, that is larger (smaller) than 1 indicates 
that a bank has disproportionately more (less) influence within the organization and may be able 
to bargain for relatively more (less) headquarters support than its ownership rights would 
suggest.
9  
Figures 4-A and 4-B depict the nonlinear relations between a member bank’s size,  voting 
rights, ownership rights, and influence within the group. Figure 4-B illustrates a negative 
correlation of -53% between influence and size, but a lot of the variations in the influence proxy 
are not explained by size, and we show in subsequent analyses that our results are not driven by 
this correlation. To take into account the possibility that size may have nonlinear impacts, we also 
estimate regressions separately for different size group samples (results are available upon 
request). We also show, by separately controlling for voting and ownership rights, that it is the 
ratio between the two variables that drives our results.  
 
2.3 Controlling for Investment Opportunities  
Accounting for investment opportunities, which may differ across banks, is a major 
challenge in the banking and internal capital market literatures. Changes in loan growth could be 
driven by unobserved differences in local economic circumstances faced by different banks. 
Moreover, changes in local deposits may partially reflect changes in lending opportunities. Four 
aspects of our empirical design allow us to mitigate these endogeneity concerns: the homogeneity 
                                                 
9 For illustration, consider a larger bank and a smaller bank, both controlling seven votes (which is typical, 
as half of the member banks have six or seven votes; see Figure 3). There are two alternative ways to think 
about the smaller bank’s disproportionate influence. First, the smaller bank has more incentive to use its 
voting rights to obtain private favors from headquarters, because it does not internalize the costs to 
headquarters as much as the larger bank. Therefore, the smaller bank is more eager to exert influence. 
Second, although both banks have seven votes, the smaller bank, because of its smaller size, can be 
satisfied with fewer resources in an absolute sense and thus will usually request a smaller favor from 
headquarters. From the perspective of headquarters, it is easier to accommodate the smaller bank’s request. 
Therefore, the smaller bank is more likely to receive favors when requested. To sum up, the smaller bank is 
more influential and successful in obtaining resources from headquarters, because it has more votes relative 
to its ownership rights and size.   10
of member banks, the use of regional fixed effects that change each quarter, the possibility to 
directly control for bank productivity, and an event that implied an exogenous shock to the banks 
deposits.  
First, the homogeneity of the member banks within the group facilitates across-bank 
comparisons. Using the same brand name, all member banks operate with the same business 
model and use identical products and pricing policies. Each member bank operates only in its 
own local area. Some member banks are larger because they cover a larger area and thus have 
more branch locations.  
Second, while the group’s overall market is highly homogeneous in terms of social and 
economic development, we further control for variations in local market conditions by employing 
regional fixed effects that change each quarter.
10 As a result, each time period we compare a 
member bank to the other member banks (on average, about one dozen) in its relatively small 
proximate region. Since we allow this local economic environment to change each quarter, the 
effect of local market conditions on loan and deposit growth of banks in the region should be 
largely captured by these region-by-quarter fixed effects. Our results are also robust to the further 
inclusion of bank fixed effects.
  
In addition, the supply of local deposits could be considered largely exogenous to the 
member banks, since all member banks are offering the same rates for the same deposit products. 
Deposit growth also seems to be unrelated to bank effort since we do not find any evidence that 
total full-time working hours at a member bank, a proxy for effort, are correlated with deposit 
growth. The supply of local deposits seems thus influenced mainly by local economic and 
demographic conditions, competition with banks outside the group, and macroeconomic factors. 
We try to control for these factors by using the region-by-quarter fixed effects. 
Third, our data set includes the banking group’s own internal measure of bank 
productivity, defined as income over costs, and measures how well a member bank is turning 
inputs (costs) into output (income) in its lending activities. Controlling for current (and even 
future) productivity differences further mitigates concerns about unobserved investment 
opportunity differences. 
Finally, we exploit an exogenous shock to deposit growth to mitigate the concern that 
influence may be proxying for some unobserved difference in bank productivity. In the second 
quarter of 2007, as a result of a foreign takeover of a major rival, the banking group observed a 
                                                 
10 We divide the overall market of the banking group into a dozen regions. The average region has 1.4 
million residents in a relatively small area of about 2,800 km² (about 1,100 square miles, i.e., one-fifth the 
size of the state of Connecticut) and is highly homogeneous in terms of social and economic development.   11
large inflow of deposits. These inflows were largely exogenous to the investment opportunities of 
the member banks. Importantly, these windfall deposits occur for basically all member banks of 
the group, and the abnormal deposit inflows do not seem to be correlated with our influence 
measure. 
 
2.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Our proprietary data set is from the banking group’s own internal managerial accounting 
system. We can observe each member bank’s loans and deposits and all internal capital transfer 
on a quarterly basis from January 2005 to September 2007. Panel A of Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics on bank characteristics. Definitions of all variables can be found in 
Appendix A1 and correlations of the main variables in Appendix A2.  
Not surprisingly, the main source of member bank funding comes from deposits by 
customers in the local market (57%). A member bank’s main form of investments is loans  to its 
customers (80%), in particular, personal loans (mostly residential mortgage loans). The banking 
group’s internal performance assessment measure (‘Bank Productivity’) has an average value of 
1.35 and a standard deviation of 0.17. The influence variable has an average of 1.24, and its 
standard deviation of 0.42 indicates significant cross-sectional variation. Banks hold, on average, 
6.4 voting rights (votes) in headquarters and have an average ownership share of 0.54% (number 
of shares of a bank divided by total number of shares outstanding). 
Panel B provides statistics of the internal capital market. It documents significant two-
way fund transfers within the group. Funds from headquarters constitute, on average, 30% of the 
total funding of a member bank. The average bank deposits 11% of its total assets at   
headquarters. As a result, net funds from headquarters are equal to 19% of total assets. In 94% of 
the bank-quarters, calculated over the sample period, banks are net receivers of funds from 
headquarters.
11  Therefore, member banks rely significantly on funding from headquarters to 
finance their local lending.  
 
3. Empirical Results  
3.1 Bank Influence and Internal Capital Allocation  
We start by analyzing capital allocations from the headquarters to the member banks and 
how influence relates to these capital transfers. In particular, we want to understand whether more 
                                                 
11 Sixteen out of 181 individual banks are net payers into the system in at least one quarter. Out of these 16 
banks, four are net payers throughout the whole sample period (i.e., 11 quarters), three for 10 quarters, and 
the rest, on average, for five quarters.     12
influential banks receive more funds from the headquarters. This analysis provides us with some 
first insights on whether capital allocations are related to corporate politics (i.e., influence of 
member banks) inside the organization. We measure internal capital transfers by looking at the 
ratio of net funds from headquarters divided by member banks’ total assets.  
As control variables, we include local deposit growth, bank size, solvency, and bank 
productivity. Deposit Growth is included to measure the local cash flows available at the member 
bank level to finance lending. Bank Size is the log of total assets. Solvency is a measure of capital 
constraints and calculated as the ratio of a bank’s actual capital to what is required for banking 
supervision purposes. Bank Productivity is included to control for investment opportunities at the 
individual bank level. As indicated, all regressions also use region-by-time fixed effects to further 
control for variations in local market conditions, especially with regard to investment 
opportunities. All standard errors throughout the paper are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered 
at the member bank level. 
 The regression results are reported in Table 2. They show that member banks with lower 
local deposit growth receive more funds from headquarters, suggesting that headquarters (at least 
partially) compensates member banks when they face a lower deposit base. Since the banks in the 
group are not allowed to access the external capital markets directly, their difference in reliance 
on internal funding cannot be explained by some banks’ superior access to non-retail-deposit 
funding from external sources. The significantly positive coefficient on the bank productivity 
variable suggests that capital allocation does relate to banks’ investment opportunities. Banks that 
are more productive, and thus may have better investment opportunities, generally receive more 
funding from the headquarters. This is consistent, for example, with the theory and evidence in 
Stein (1997) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), which implies that more productive units 
inside an organization should receive more funds from headquarters. We also find that larger 
banks generally receive more funding from headquarters. 
Most important, we find that our influence measure is significantly related to capital 
allocations. Consistent with both the information asymmetry hypothesis and the empire building 
hypothesis, more influential banks receive significantly more funds from headquarters.
 The effect 
of influence on internal capital allocation is also economically large. Based on the coefficient 
estimate from column 1, an increase in our influence variable by one standard deviation is 
associated with an increase in the ratio of net funds from headquarters to total assets by 
0.42*0.143 = 6%. This is over half the cross-sectional standard deviation and about a third of the 
median ratio of net funds from headquarters over total assets.   13
About 6% of banks are net suppliers of funds into the internal capital markets. If we 
model the determinants of a bank being a net payer into the system (column 7), we find, 
consistent with the previous evidence, that such banks are generally less influential within the 
group.  
To mitigate concerns that our results are driven by variation in ownership or voting rights 
rather than by variation in the ratio of the two, the regressions in columns 3-6 directly control for 
both ownership and voting rights, on top of our influence measure. The estimates show that our 
results are mostly driven by the ratio of voting rights to ownership rights, not the two components 
of the ratio.
12 
It is possible that influence may proxy for some unobserved variations in investment 
opportunities across banks, and headquarters is actually allocating resources to banks with higher 
investment opportunities, which happen to have greater influence as well. As researchers, we 
have the benefit of hindsight and can observe future realized productivity.
13 In Columns 4-6, 
instead of current bank productivity, we control for bank productivity that is 1, 2, and 4 quarters 
ahead in the future, respectively.
14 We find that influence remains a significant determinant of 
capital allocation, even after controlling for future realized productivity. This mitigates the 
concern that our influence measure is correlated with or proxying for (changes in) future 
investment opportunities.  
 
3.2 Bank Influence and Lending 
In this subsection, we analyze the lending behavior of the banks, in particular, how a 
bank’s influence relates to the sensitivity of its loan growth to its local deposit growth (see, e.g., 
Houston et al., 1997 and Campello, 2002). Loan growth needs to be financed by cash flows from 
local sources (deposit growth or retained profits) or by capital transfers from headquarters. 
Regressing loan growth on local deposit growth as well as a set of controls, the coefficient of 
deposit growth, i.e., the sensitivity of loan growth to local deposit growth, reflects how much a 
                                                 
12 In unreported regressions, we also separate our sample based on bank size at the beginning of the sample 
period. Our results are robust to such separations and thus unlikely to be driven by a nonlinearity in the 
influence-size relationship. We also consider subsamples based on the banks’ voting and ownership rights 
and our results are also robust to such separations.  
13 Our aim in this analysis is not to make any statements about whether allocations are efficient in our 
group, but to make sure that our results on the effect of influence on capital allocation are not driven by 
heterogeneity in future investment opportunities.  
14 We thank Utpal Bhattacharya for suggesting this method. A possible limitation is that future productivity 
may be affected by current (distorted) allocations, and therefore, we will of course never know what the 
perfect allocation should have been. However, an allocation based on incorporating knowledge on future 
productivity (i.e., with the benefit of hindsight) would still seem to be relatively more efficient.   14
bank’s lending depends on internal sources of funding. We investigate the importance of 
influence by interacting deposit growth with our influence proxy, thus allowing the loan-to-
deposit sensitivity to vary across banks of high versus low influence. We further try to distinguish 
between the information asymmetry and the empire building hypothesis by separately considering 
positive and negative deposit growth. To control for investment opportunities, we include region-
by-quarter fixed effects and bank productivity. Additional controls are the log of total assets, 
growth in bank capital, the measure of capital constraints (Solvency), and loan loss provisions 
over total assets. We also check whether our results are robust to adding bank fixed effects, which 
should account for time-invariant, bank-specific unobserved heterogeneity. 
  The results are reported in Table 3. They show that locally generated funds (i.e., deposit 
growth) are positively related to loan growth. The results in column 1 imply that, for a member 
bank with influence equal to 1, i.e., no deviation from one-share-one-vote, a one-standard-
deviation increase in deposit growth (3.8%) is associated with a 3.8%*(0.286 – 0.157*1) = 0.49% 
increase in loan growth. While we cannot completely rule out that this correlation is partially 
driven by investment opportunities, our focus in this paper is on how this correlation varies across 
member banks with high versus low influence.  
The interaction term between deposit growth and the influence measure provides strong 
evidence that more influential member banks exhibit a lower sensitivity of their lending to their 
own local cash flows, since its coefficient is negative (-0.157 in column 1) and statistically 
significant. The results in column 1 imply that, for a member bank with relatively little influence 
(influence equal to 0.5), loan growth increases by 0.79% after a one-standard-deviation increase 
in deposit growth. This effect is much greater than in banks with influence equal to 1 (0.49%, as 
discussed above). This contrasts with the effect for a relatively more influential bank (influence 
value of 2), where the loan growth is slightly negative and close to zero (–0.11%) after a one-
standard-deviation increase in deposit growth. These results are robust to also controlling for 
bank fixed effects (column 2). 
In column 3 and 4, we explicitly distinguish between positive and negative deposit 
growth: the variable Deposit Growth
+ takes the value of the deposit growth rate if positive and 
zero if negative, and Deposit Growth
– takes the absolute value of the deposit growth rate if 
negative and zero if positive. The results show that in the case of positive deposit growth, more 
influential banks are more likely to restrain their loan growth. This behavior differs from that of 
less influential banks, which seem to boost lending after positive deposit growth. In the case of 
negative deposit growth, we find that more influential banks are less likely to decrease lending. 
Overall, this suggests that more influential banks are not only less likely to decrease lending after   15
cash outflows (negative deposit growth), but are also less likely to increase lending in response to 
cash inflows (positive deposit growth).  
The results on positive deposit growth are not consistent with the empire building 
hypothesis, which would predict that more influence leads to more lending, especially in the 
context of positive deposit growth (see Blanchard et al., 1994). Rather, it supports the information 
asymmetry hypothesis and that influence improves the information flow between headquarters 
and the member banks. Recall our previous result that more influential member banks receive 
more funding from headquarters. That result is also consistent with smaller information 
asymmetry frictions vis-à-vis headquarters for more influential banks: headquarters entrusts more 
funds to the more influential banks, allowing them to expand beyond the limit of their local 
deposit supply (see Table 2) and such banks refrain from increasing lending too much when 
experiencing positive deposit growth (see Table 3). The situation is opposite for less influential 
banks. They receive less funding from the headquarters and instead (have to) seize the 
opportunities of positive deposit growth to increase their lending.  
The negative coefficient on the interaction of deposit growth and influence is robust to 
adding interactions between deposit growth and ownership rights and between deposit growth and 
voting rights (columns 5-7). Therefore, the results on influence are not driven by variations in 
either ownership or voting rights themselves, but rather by variation in their ratio. Our results are 
also robust to adding the average loan growth in a region, which is included to control for the 
loan demand in a region (column 7). Note that our results are again robust to using bank fixed 
effects in addition to the region-by-time fixed effects.
15 
 
3.3 Windfall Deposits and Accounting for Differences in Productivity and Size  
In this section, we first investigate an exogenous event that resulted in a windfall increase 
in deposits and then conduct some robustness tests to see whether our results on the effect of 
influence on the loan-to-deposit growth sensitivity are driven by differences in bank productivity, 
size, etc, across member banks.  
First, we exploit an exogenous event to mitigate the concern that influence may be 
proxying for some unobserved difference in bank productivity. Although our influence measure 
                                                 
15  In unreported regressions, we decompose deposit growth by product types into transaction account 
deposit growth, term deposit growth, and savings deposit growth and find that lending is mainly sensitive 
to changes in savings deposits. The results show that changes in transaction account deposits, compared 
with changes in savings account deposits, have only a negligible impact on loan growth. This mitigates the 
concern that the correlation between loans and deposits arises naturally since banks require borrowers to 
maintain a transaction account with the banks for monitoring purposes (see Fama, 1980, 1985).   16
remains the same over the sample period, it seems less valuable when most banks have significant 
excess internal cash flows. In the second quarter of 2007, as a result of a foreign takeover of a 
major rival, the banking group experienced a large and exogenous inflow of deposits. The inflow 
of deposits is apparent from Figure 5, which shows that deposit growth in this quarter is more 
than three times its normal level. While deposits increase substantially, lending increases by only 
about 15%.
16 Importantly, these windfall deposits occur for basically all member banks of the 
group, and the abnormal deposit inflows do not seem to be correlated with our influence measure. 
Most member banks therefore receive a windfall relief in their funding constraints in this 
quarter, implying less need for additional allocations of funds from headquarters. It is thus 
plausible to argue that influence is less valuable under both hypotheses when banks experience 
large deposit inflows that relieve financial constraints. As a result, we would expect that the 
coefficient on the triple interaction of influence, deposit growth, and the event dummy to be 
positive, which implies that the coefficient on the double interaction term between influence and 
deposit growth should be less negative during the event quarter than in other periods.   
In contrast, it is unlikely that any unobserved productivity differences across member 
banks should change during this quarter. If influence is simply proxying for unobserved 
productivity, we should thus expect that the effect of influence should remain the same during 
this quarter (i.e., it should not be different from all other quarters of the sample period). In this 
case, we would expect the coefficient on the triple interaction of influence, deposit growth and 
the event dummy to be zero or insignificant; i.e., the coefficient on the double interaction term 
between influence and deposit growth should be the same during the event as in other periods  
To investigate this, columns 8 and 9 of Table 3, include a 2007Q2 dummy variable and 
its interactions with deposit growth, influence, and ‘deposit growth * influence’ (which creates a 
triple interaction term), respectively. We find that the coefficient on this triple interaction term, 
‘deposit growth*influence*2007Q2,’ is significantly positive and economically meaningful. It 
suggests that the effect of influence on the loan-to-deposit-growth sensitivity is significantly 
smaller during the event quarter, supporting the idea that influence matters less in the case of a 
large exogenous windfall cash flow. As argued, this finding mitigates concerns that our influence 
measure simply proxies for unobserved productivity, which is not expected to change 
systematically during this quarter. Moreover, it seems to be inconsistent with the empire building 
                                                 
16  About three-quarters of the deposit inflows are from households, and therefore, it is unlikely that the 
windfalls are driven by business customers immediately moving both their deposit and lending relationship 
to the bank.   17
hypothesis, which would predict that more influential banks extend lending in response to a 
positive and exogenous cash windfall (see Blanchard et al., 1994).  
Second, we modify the analysis of Table 3 to allow the sensitivity of net loan growth to 
deposit growth to vary across banks with good and poor performance. The results are reported in 
Table 4. Our main measure of bank performance is obtained from the group’s internal accounting 
system. Specifically, Bank Productivity is an income-over-cost ratio, which measures how well a 
member bank is turning input (costs) into output (income) in its lending activities. This can also 
be interpreted as a measure of a bank’s investment opportunities, since more productive banks 
can produce higher outputs for the same amount of capital allocation from headquarters. As an 
additional check, we also consider ROA and ROE as alternative measures of bank performance. 
Previously in Table 2, we found that more productive banks, as measured by bank 
productivity, receive more funding from headquarters. We now simultaneously control for 
productivity, influence and their respective interactions with deposit growth. We thereby test 
whether our previous results on influence are merely driven by differences in productivity.  
The results first show that for relatively more productive banks (using Bank Productivity 
and ROE), net loan growth is not only significantly higher but also significantly less sensitive to 
their own deposit growth. Further, the effect of bank influence documented previously not only 
stays significant but is even stronger in these regressions that control for the effect of Bank 
Productivity, ROE or ROA and their interactions with deposit growth (see columns 1-3 for results 
with region-by-time fixed effects and columns 5-7 for results with both region-by-time fixed 
effects and bank fixed effects). These results suggest that the allocation of capital in the internal 
capital market responds to both influence and productivity, and banks’ investments are more 
independent from their own cash flows when they are either more influential or more productive. 
Overall, the results confirm that our results on the effect of influence do not seem driven by our 
influence measure proxying for ability.
17  Finally, we test whether our results are driven by 
differences in bank size. Columns 4 and 8 show that our influence results are robust to including 
an interaction of bank size and deposit growth.
18  
                                                 
17 In unreported regressions, we replace the contemporaneous productivity by its average level during the 
sample period to mitigate concerns that our productivity measure is endogenous to the funding constraint  
faced by a bank and may not actually reflect investment opportunities. Our results do not change when we 
use this alternative measure of productivity. 
18 To further make sure that our influence results do not just pick up the nonlinearity between influence and 
size, we again separate our sample based on bank size at the beginning of the sample period. The estimates 
show that our results are robust to such a size separation and hence again unlikely to be driven by a 
nonlinearity in the influence-size relationship. For further robustness, we also consider sub-samples based 
on the banks’ voting and ownership rights, respectively. Again, our results are robust to such separations.     18
3.4 Influence and Information Asymmetry Problems  
Our findings so far point to the information asymmetry hypothesis; i.e., greater influence 
results in a better information flow between headquarters and a bank, since greater influence is 
associated with a lower sensitivity of loan growth to deposit growth. If influence mitigates 
information asymmetry within the banking group, we should expect that influence is particularly 
relevant at banks or for loan products where information asymmetry is relatively more important. 
We examine the differential effects of influence across subsamples by (1) sorting member banks 
into subsamples based on their level of information asymmetry vis-à-vis headquarters; and by (2) 
dividing the loans of a given bank into those subject to high versus low levels of information 
asymmetry. While we have no direct evidence that influence can address information asymmetry 
problems or help in transmitting soft information (as in Stein, 2002), such sub-sample analysis 
can arguably provide some circumstantial evidence about whether influence may matter for 
information asymmetry. 
First, in order to separate our sample into banks with high and low levels of information 
asymmetry vis-à-vis headquarters, we use two proxies for information asymmetries: deposit 
growth volatility and the physical distance between headquarters and a member bank. We 
measure deposit growth volatility by calculating the standard deviation of a bank’s deposit 
growth. While deposit growth is observable and verifiable by  headquarters, it may proxy for the 
importance of information asymmetry in the following sense. More volatile deposit growth is 
associated with greater fluctuations in the funding gaps (i.e., funding deficits or surpluses 
between investment opportunities and local deposit growth). Banks with greater deposit growth 
volatility therefore experience larger funding deficits more frequently. Since larger requests will 
need to be reviewed by a committee at headquarters, they need to be justified with more detailed 
information about investment opportunities by the member bank (compared to smaller funding 
requests, which are routinely approved by headquarters). This presumably increases the 
importance for information flows between the member bank and the headquarters. Therefore, for 
two banks with the same level of structural funding deficits over the long term, the one with more 
volatile local deposit growth will be more exposed to any information asymmetries vis-à-vis 
headquarters. 
With regard to the other proxy, we assume that banks that are in close proximity to 
headquarters are less exposed to asymmetric information vis-à-vis headquarters (see e.g., Coval 
and Moskowitz, 1999, Dell’Ariccia, 2001, Hauswald and Marquez, 2006, Degryse and Ongena, 
2005, Landier, Nair, and Wulf, 2007, and Liberti and Mian, 2009).     19
Table 5 reports in Panel A the results of loan growth regressions for sub-samples of 
banks with different levels of information asymmetry using the deposit growth volatility and 
distance to headquarters proxies. We compare the sub-sample of banks in the upper half (or top 
quartile) with banks in the lower half (or bottom quartile) of the distribution of the respective 
information asymmetry proxy. The results provide evidence consistent with the information 
asymmetry hypothesis and show that greater influence significantly reduces the sensitivity of 
lending to the own cash flows only in the subsample of banks where information asymmetries 
may be the greatest. In the sub-samples of banks with low levels of information asymmetry, the 
coefficient on deposit growth interacted with influence is significant in none of the specifications 
and is in economic terms always smaller. For the sub-sample of banks where our proxy suggests 
greater (importance of) information asymmetry, the same interaction terms are significant in all 
cases, even after controlling for region-by-time fixed effects and for bank fixed effects.
19   
Overall, these results suggest that member bank influence is most strongly associated 
with the loan-to-deposit sensitivity when information asymmetry is the greatest.
20  
Second, we decompose loan growth of a bank into its two subcomponents, business loan 
growth and personal loan growth. Personal loans, according to the banking group’s definition, 
include mainly residential mortgage loans and consumer loans, with the lion’s share being 
residential mortgage loans. The evaluation and approval process of such loans are more 
automated and contain relatively little subjective information. In the banking group, large 
corporate loans are handled by the headquarters, and therefore, most business loans at the 
member banks are small business loans. These business loans tend to be more soft-information-
intensive, and it may hence be more difficult for headquarters to verify local bank managers’ 
claims of investment opportunities and creditworthiness and to evaluate their decisions. Liberti 
and Mian (2009), for example, look into the paper trails of corporate loan evaluation files and 
                                                 
19 In unreported regressions, we also use the age of a bank as a proxy for information asymmetry and 
assume that older and more established banks have a longer track record and are less exposed to 
information asymmetry vis-à-vis headquarters. While most banks in the sample are relatively old (the 
median bank age is 101 years old, while bank age has a standard deviation of only 9 years), we still find 
that the interaction term deposit growth * influence is statistically significant only for those banks that are 
younger than the median bank. 
20 In unreported regressions, we also distinguish between positive and negative deposit growth. The empire 
building hypothesis would predict that more influential banks increase their lending more than less 
influential banks when positive growth occurs. However, our results do not suggest this. Instead, more 
influential banks generally invest less when positive deposit growth occurs, which is again rather consistent 
with the information asymmetry hypothesis. While not all interactions of positive deposit growth and 
influence are statistically significant in the subsample with high information asymmetry (which might be 
partially due to the reduced sample size) they are all economically large and positive. Influence thus does 
not seem to lead to more lending when positive deposit growth occurs (as predicted by the empire building 
hypothesis).       20
document the difficulty of passing soft (i.e., abstract and/or subjective) information up the 
hierarchy in a large banking corporation. The information asymmetry hypothesis would thus 
predict that member bank influence has a stronger effect for business loans versus personal 
loans.
21  
The regressions in Panel B show that this is indeed the case. Columns 1-2 use business 
loan growth as the dependent variable, while columns 3-4 use personal loan growth. First, we find 
that the sensitivity of loan growth to deposit growth is much smaller for personal loan growth 
than for business loan growth (half if comparing columns 1 and 3, and one-tenth if comparing 
columns 2 and 4). The effect of influence correspondingly is smaller for the same magnitude for 
personal loan growth. These results suggest that when facing positive deposit growth, less 
influential banks are more likely to expand their business lending (vis-à-vis their personal 
lending), while more influential banks show relative restraints in doing so. The incentive for less 
influential banks to rapidly increase personal loans (which are mostly residential real estate loans 
and contain mostly hard information) may be smaller because it seems less difficult for any 
member banks (influential or not) to convince headquarters with hard information when 
investment opportunities on residential real estate loans arise. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper looks into the internal capital market of a large retail-banking group to study 
how corporate politics affect internal capital allocation and lending behavior. The group consists 
of 181 member banks, which own the headquarters. As a proxy for a member bank’s 
disproportionate influence inside the organization, we use the divergence from one-share-one-
vote. Influence within the banking group may affect internal capital allocations and member bank 
lending through two different mechanisms. Influence can be used (1) to overcome information 
asymmetries between member banks and headquarters, and/or (2) to allow member bank 
managers to engage in empire building.  
We document an active internal capital market. Net funds from headquarters partly 
compensate member banks for lower deposit growth and are larger if investment opportunities are 
better. While member banks’ loan growth is higher for more productive banks with better 
opportunities, it also depends significantly on their own deposit growth. More influential banks 
receive more funds from headquarters, which is consistent with both the empire building and 
information asymmetry hypotheses. 
                                                 
21 There is no significant relation between a bank’s influence and the share of business loans in its portfolio.   21
Next, the loan growth of more influential banks is less sensitive to their own deposit 
growth. We also find that influence is more important in reducing the sensitivity of loan growth 
to deposit growth when information asymmetry problems are likely to be more severe, based on a 
number of proxies. Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, more influential 
member banks are not only less likely to decrease lending after negative deposit growth, but they 
are also less likely to increase lending in response to positive deposit growth. The latter finding is 
inconsistent with the empire building hypothesis.  
While several organizational features are certainly specific to our banking group, our 
findings may have implications that go beyond this organization. First, this group’s structure is 
not uncommon. All 27 countries in the European Union, for example, have banking groups that 
show similar organizational structures, i.e., where the headquarters is owned by the subsidiaries, 
which in turn have dispersed outside shareholders. By the end of 2006, these groups had in total 
more than 4,000 member banks operating around 60,000 branches for about 140 million 
customers. They had total assets of more than 4.6 trillion EUR and a market share of around 20% 
in the deposit market.  
Further, most large commercial banks operate their business organizations in broadly 
similar ways. Specifically, many large banks seem to share the following features: (1) 
divisions/branches are set up based on geographic areas; (2) branch managers have autonomy in 
making loans and taking deposits in local markets, but with uniform pricing across branches; (3) 
in developed countries, branches and the bank as a whole typically make more loans than the 
amount of deposits they collect and need to ask headquarters for funding (with headquarters in 
turn raising money in the external capital market); (4) branch managers have better information 
on investment opportunities vis-à-vis headquarters and may have a personal incentive to expand 
their size; and (5) some branch managers may have more influence than others within the bank.    22
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
           
Panel A provides summary statistics of the member banks in our sample. It reports both the panel (overall) as well as cross-
sectional (between) standard deviations. For definitions of the variables see Appendix A1. Correlations between the main 
variables are reported in Appendix A2. We use quarterly data for the period Q1 2005 to Q3 2007. The total number of banks in 
the sample is 181 and the total number of observations is 1991. Business Loan Growth and Personal Loan Growth are 
winsorized at 5%. Panel B provides details on the capital flows from and to headquarters (HQ). Funds from HQ are the loans 
extended by headquarters to the member banks in the group. Deposits at HQ are the funds deposited by member banks at the 
headquarters. Net HQ Funds is the difference between loans from headquarters and deposits at headquarters.  
           
Panel A: Bank Characteristics           
           
Variable Mean  Median  Panel  STD  Cross-Sect. 
STD 
5% 95% 
Deposits/Total Assets  0.57  0.57  0.08  0.08  0.44  0.70 
Deposit Growth (in %)  1.87  1.63  3.78  0.79  -2.36  6.79 
Loans/Total Assets  0.80  0.81  0.04  0.04  0.73  0.85 
Business Loans/Total Assets  0.25  0.24  0.07  0.07  0.15  0.38 
Personal Loans/Total Assets  0.55  0.56  0.08  0.07  0.43  0.67 
Loan Growth (in %)  2.13  1.98  1.63  0.82  0.09  4.63 
Business Loan Growth (in %)  1.59  1.37  2.58  1.08  -2.79  7.28 
Personal Loan Growth (in %)  2.21  2.09  1.19  0.70  0.23  4.71 
Bank Capital/Total Assets  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.08 
Bank Capital Growth (in %)  1.40  0.00  3.87  0.85  -0.28  8.87 
Bank Productivity  1.35  1.34  0.17  0.15  1.10  1.62 
Solvency 1.40  1.43  0.25  0.24  1.01  1.77 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Assets (in %)  0.050  0.012  0.115  0.033  -0.080  0.259 
ROE (in %)  8.65  8.78  2.55  1.79  4.45  12.25 
ROA (in %)  0.406  0.386  0.203  0.108  0.126  0.773 
Influence 1.24  1.15  0.42  0.42  0.68  2.01 
Ownership Rights (in %)  0.54  0.49  0.29  0.29  0.18  1.10 
Voting Rights  6.44  7.00  1.72  1.72  4.00  9.00 
STD Deposit Growth (in %)  3.13  2.62  2.32  2.33  1.67  5.41 
Distance to Headquarters (in km)  118  116  62  63  24  239 
Average Loan Growth Region (in %)  1.87  1.57  1.93  0.30  -0.91  5.48 
            
Panel B: Internal Capital Market Characteristics         
           
Variable 
Mean Median Panel  STD Cross-Sect. 
STD 
5% 95% 
Funds from HQ (in 1000 EUR)  370,000  307,000  291,000   286,000   70,800  862,000 
Funds from HQ/Total Assets  0.30  0.30  0.09  0.09  0.15  0.44 
Deposits at HQ (in 1000 EUR)  126,000  107,000  87,300   83,500   32,600  283,000 
Deposits at HQ/Total Assets  0.11  0.10  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.17 
Net HQ Funds (in 1000 EUR)  245,000  188,000  245,000  240,000  -10,700  641,000 
Net HQ Funds/Total Assets  0.19  0.20  0.11  0.11  -0.01  0.36 
Net Provider of Funds  0.06           
Net Receiver of Funds  0.94                
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Table 2: Member Bank Influence and Funding from Headquarters  
             
This table looks at the determinants of net funding from headquarters. In column 1-6, the dependent variable is net funds from 
headquarters (defined as loans from headquarters minus deposits at headquarters) divided by total assets of a member bank. In 
column 7, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is one if a bank is a net provider of funds in a given quarter. For 
definitions of the variables see Appendix A1. Our measure of influence is the influence of a member bank in the group. It is 
defined as the share of voting rights divided by the share of ownership rights of a member bank in headquarters. The 
regressions use quarterly data from Q1 2005 to Q3 2007 for 181 banks. All standard errors are clustered at the member bank 
level. Constants were included in the regressions but are not reported. Absolute values of robust t statistics are reported in 
parentheses, * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
             




    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)      (7) 
            
Deposit  Growth  -0.0029*** -0.0029*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0030***   0.0016 
  (4.86) (4.86) (5.03) (5.71) (5.45) (5.64)    (0.97) 
Influence  0.1430*** 0.1397*** 0.1529*** 0.1533*** 0.1530*** 0.1518***   -0.1463** 
  (4.71) (4.04) (4.27) (4.33) (4.37) (4.37)    (2.20) 
Voting Rights      -0.0222  -0.0239*  -0.0251*  -0.0247*     
     (1.61)  (1.71)  (1.79)  (1.76)     
Ownership Rights    -0.0092  0.0211  0.0216  0.0199  0.0157     
   (0.25)  (0.52)  (0.53)  (0.49)  (0.39)     
Log(Total  Assets)  0.0740*** 0.0763*** 0.1305*** 0.1348*** 0.1383*** 0.1372***  -0.0717 
  (3.94) (3.83) (3.34) (3.42) (3.51) (3.47)    (1.57) 
Solvency  -0.1497*** -0.1490*** -0.1487*** -0.1488*** -0.1475*** -0.1453***  0.1447** 
  (6.47) (6.49) (6.45) (6.37) (6.28) (5.88)    (2.06) 
Bank Productivity  0.1252***  0.1245*** 0.1271***         -0.1204 
 (3.22)  (3.21)  (3.32)          (1.35) 
Bank Productivity (t+1)        0.1242***         
       (3.36)         
Bank Productivity (t+2)          0.1218***       
         (3.41)       
Bank  Productivity  (t+4)        0.1228***     
        (3.47)     
            
Region-by-Time-Fixed  Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES    YES 
Bank  Fixed  Effects  NO NO NO NO NO NO    NO 
Clustering by Bank  YES  YES YES YES YES YES    YES 
            
Observations  1810 1810 1810 1629 1448 1086    1810 
(Pseudo)  R-squared  0.625 0.626 0.631 0.635 0.637 0.635      0.231 
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Table 3: Member Bank Influence and the Sensitivity of Loan Growth to Deposit Growth 
               
This table looks at the determinants of loan growth (in %). As independent variables, we use deposit growth, our influence measure, an interaction of deposit growth and the influence 
variable and a set of control variables. Our measure of influence is the share of voting rights divided by the share of ownership rights of a member bank in headquarters. In column 3 
and 4, Deposit Growth
+ is a variable that takes the values of Deposit Growth if positive and 0 otherwise. Likewise, Deposit Growth
- is a variable that takes the absolute values of 
Deposit Growth if negative and 0 otherwise. Average loan growth is the average loan growth in a region computed for our sample of banks. The regressions in columns 8 and 9 include 
a dummy that is one if an observation is from the second quarter of 2007. As a result of a foreign takeover of a major rival, the banking group observed a large inflow of deposits in this 
quarter. Deposit growth in this quarter is more than three times its normal level. For definitions of the variables, see Appendix A1. The regressions use quarterly data from Q1 2005 to 
Q3 2007 for 181 banks. All standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Constants were included in the regressions but are not reported. Absolute values of robust t statistics are 
reported in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
   
  Loan Growth 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
                
Deposit Growth  0.2860***  0.2087***      0.2630*  0.1939  0.2055  0.3261***  0.2536*** 
 (4.16) (2.91)   (1.74) (1.23) (1.48) (4.11) (3.08)
Deposit Growth
+      0.1866***  0.0840         
      (2.85)  (1.11)         
Deposit Growth
--      -0.5177**  -0.4971**         
      (2.51)  (2.13)         
Influence 0.0810    -0.0477    0.1193      0.0915  4.1161 
  (0.31)  (0.17)    (0.32)      (0.35)  (1.57) 
Deposit Growth* Influence  -0.1570***  -0.1174***      -0.1353*  -0.1359*  -0.1366*  -0.1834***  -0.1431*** 
 (3.97)  (2.83)      (1.78)  (1.69) (1.85) (4.13)  (3.09) 
Deposit Growth
+ * Influence      -0.1109***  -0.0671           
  (2.84) (1.40) 
Deposit Growth
-- * Influence      0.2651**  0.2387*           
      (2.26)  (1.80)         
Voting Rights          -0.1724         
         (1.35)         
Ownership Rights          0.0902         
         (0.16)         
Deposit Growth * Voting Rights          -0.0051  0.0104  0.0102     
          (0.33) (0.62) (0.60)     
Deposit Growth * Ownership Rights          0.0529  -0.0638  -0.0729     
          (0.41) (0.44) (0.50)     
Q2  2007  Dummy             2.7826***   
             (3.06)   
Q2 2007 Dummy * Influence                -1.1674*  -0.9400 
   (1.90) (1.50)
Q2 2007 Dummy * Deposit Growth                -0.4117**  -0.3640** 
             (2.46)  (2.32) 
Q2 2007 Dummy * Influence * Deposit Growth                0.3434**  0.2267* 
             (2.36)  (1.71) 
Bank Capital Growth  0.0562** 0.0484 0.0504 0.0311  0.0572* 0.0441 0.0417** 0.0613** 0.0514
  (2.05)  (1.55)  (1.40)  (0.78) (1.96) (1.35) (2.35) (2.20)  (1.63)   28
Log(Total Assets)  -0.1604  3.6151 -0.1467  4.9540** 0.2959  3.4624 1.7129** -0.1518  4.2479* 
  (1.20)  (1.64)  (1.06)  (2.27) (0.78) (1.55) (2.13) (1.14)  (1.89) 
Solvency -1.6895***  -5.6276***  -1.7661***  -5.2383***  -1.6786***  -5.6656***  -5.9372***  -1.6815***  -5.4956*** 
  (5.37)  (4.25)  (5.29)  (4.33) (5.22) (4.22) (4.54) (5.39)  (4.26) 
Bank Productivity  1.9447***  0.8166  1.9495***  0.7681  1.9499***  0.8322  0.1310  1.9283***  0.8287 
  (5.46)  (0.97)  (5.34)  (0.95) (5.35) (1.00) (0.24) (5.40)  (0.98) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Assets  -0.1318  -0.5080  -0.1129  -0.4493  -0.1400  -0.5410  -0.6166  -0.1130  -0.5042 
  (0.26)  (0.86)  (0.22)  (0.77) (0.28) (0.92) (1.27) (0.22)  (0.85) 
Average Loan Growth Region   -0.0148
             (0.46)     
                
Region-by-Time-Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Bank Fixed Effects  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES 
Clustering by Bank  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
                
Observations  1810  1810  1810  1810 1810 1810 1810 1810  1810 
R-squared  0.195  0.160  0.204  0.179 0.197 0.161 0.105 0.201  0.375 
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Table 4: After Controlling for Performance and Size, More Influential Banks Still Have A Smaller Sensitivity of Loan to Deposit Growth 
          
This table examines loan growth for well and poorly managed banks. The dependent variable in all regressions is a bank’s loan growth (in %). We proxy whether a bank is well or 
poorly managed by looking at bank performance. Bank performance is measured as bank productivity, return on equity (ROE) or return on assets (ROA). For definitions of the 
variables see Appendix A1. The regressions use quarterly data from Q1 2005 to Q3 2007 for 181 banks. All standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Constants were included in 
the regressions but are not reported. Absolute values of robust t statistics are reported in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
           
  Loan Growth 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Deposit Growth  0.6425*** 0.4716*** 0.2788*** 0.4744  0.6412*** 0.4524*** 0.2217*** 0.1165
  (4.91) (3.93) (3.56) (0.70) (8.00) (9.48) (4.72) (0.32) 
Deposit Growth * Bank Productivity  -0.2518***        -0.3019***       
  (3.75)      (5.95)      
Deposit Growth * ROE    -0.0167**        -0.0209***     
   (2.24)      (7.27)    
Deposit  Growth  *  ROA     0.0172      -0.0234   
     (0.24)      (0.43)   
Deposit Growth * Log(Total Assets)      -0.0088      0.0043 
      (0.28)      (0.25) 
Influence  0.0497 0.2477 0.2854 0.0874         
  (0.19) (0.95) (1.11) (0.33)         
Deposit  Growth  *  Influence  -0.1699*** -0.1989*** -0.1541*** -0.1605*** -0.1364*** -0.1772*** -0.1205*** -0.1154*** 
  (4.02) (4.15) (3.74) (4.09) (5.98) (7.37) (4.83) (4.78) 
Bank Capital Growth  0.0309  -0.0221  0.0557*  0.0585**  0.0163  -0.0363*  0.0441**  0.0470*** 
  (1.22) (0.72) (1.91) (2.02) (0.96) (1.95) (2.56) (2.75) 
Log(Total Assets)  -0.1976  -0.1390 -0.0278 -0.1433  3.8281*** 3.0128** 3.8440*** 3.5791*** 
  (1.43) (1.09) (0.21) (0.86) (3.03) (2.44) (3.07) (2.79) 
Solvency  -1.7566*** -1.8935*** -1.8110*** -1.6862*** -5.5916*** -5.9613*** -5.7204*** -5.6367*** 
  (5.21) (5.87) (5.42) (5.29) (8.71) (9.42) (8.82) (8.67) 
Bank  Productivity  2.5464***    1.9333***  1.7137***     0.8195 
  (5.26)    (5.25)  (2.61)    (1.27) 
ROE   0.1949***      0.1515***    
   (7.13)      (6.67)    
ROA     1.9811***      0.8152   
     (4.26)      (1.54)   
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Assets  -0.1752  0.2657  1.2850**  -0.1214  -0.5068  -0.4211  0.0035  -0.5165 
  (0.35) (0.44) (2.25) (0.24) (1.08) (0.89) (0.01) (1.08) 
          
Region-by-Time-Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES
Bank  Fixed  Effects  NO NO NO NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Clustering  by  Bank  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
          
Observations  1810 1810 1810 1810 1810 1810 1810 1810 







Table 5: Member Bank Influence and Asymmetric Information 
          
This table looks at the effects of influence on the sensitivity of loan growth to deposit growth for banks with different levels of asymmetric information vis-à-vis headquarters. In Panel 
A, asymmetries of information are proxied by using the standard deviation of deposit growth of a bank during the sample period and physical distance between a bank and   
headquarters. We use the standard deviation of deposit growth as a measure of information asymmetries since more volatile deposit growth is associated with greater fluctuations in the 
funding gaps (i.e., funding deficits or surpluses between investment opportunities and local deposit growth). Banks with greater deposit growth volatility therefore experience larger 
funding deficits more frequently. Larger requests receive more scrutiny at headquarters and need to be justified with more detailed information about investment opportunities by the 
member bank (compared to smaller funding requests, which are routinely approved by headquarters). This presumably increases the importance for information flows between the 
member bank and the headquarters. We separate the sample into banks with low and high levels of asymmetric information based on whether the standard deviation of deposit growth is 
below or above the sample median (columns 1-2) and based on whether a bank is in the bottom or top variable quartile (columns 3-4). Likewise, we separate the sample into banks 
based on whether the distance between the bank and the headquarters is below or above the sample median (columns 5-6) and based on whether a bank is in the bottom or top variable 
quartile (columns 7-8). In Panel B, we separate loan growth into business and personal loan growth and examine business and personal loan growth (which are predominantly residential 
mortgage loans) separately. Business loans tend to be more soft-information-intensive, which is more difficult to transmit and it is hence more difficult for headquarters to verify local 
bank managers’ claims of investment opportunities and creditworthiness and to evaluate their decisions. For definitions of the variables see Appendix A1. The regressions use quarterly 
data for 181 banks from Q1 2005 to Q3 2007. All standard errors are clustered at the member bank level. Constants were included in the regressions but are not reported. Absolute 
values of robust t statistics are reported in parentheses, * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Panel A: Deposit Growth Volatility and Distance to Headquarters    
  Loan Growth 
Measure of Inform. Asymmetry   Deposit Growth Volatility    Distance to Headquarters 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Asymmetric Info Bank-HQ  Asymmetric Info Bank-HQ    Asymmetric Info Bank-HQ  Asymmetric Info Bank-HQ 
 Low High Low High   Low High Low High
  (STD Dep. Gr.  (STD Dep. Gr.  (Q1 STD  (Q4 STD    (Distance  (Distance  (Q1   (Q4 
   ≤Median) >Median)  Dep.  Growth)  Dep.  Growth)    ≤Median) >Median) Distance) Distance) 
              
Deposit Growth  0.1922**  0.2776***  0.1248  0.3906***    0.2614*  0.2777***  0.0634  0.2578** 
 (2.44)  (3.25)  (1.33)  (3.11)    (1.98) (2.97) (0.57) (2.19) 
Influence 0.1716  -0.4850  0.4606  0.8329    0.2548  -0.1914  -0.1996  0.4043 
 (0.52)  (1.49)  (0.74)  (1.54)    (0.74) (0.45) (0.42) (1.13) 
Deposit Growth* Influence  -0.0878  -0.1467***  -0.0157  -0.2193***    -0.0907  -0.1842**  0.0020  -0.1959** 
 (1.51)  (3.06)  (0.21)  (3.10)    (1.05) (2.53) (0.02) (2.02) 
Log(Total Assets)  -0.0159  -0.3998*** 0.1819  -0.0454    0.1058 -0.3601** -0.0177 -0.1466 
 (0.09)  (2.74)  (0.47)  (0.20)    (0.48) (2.06) (0.05) (0.52) 
Solvency -1.1400***  -1.9025***  -0.7165  -1.3626**    -1.0068**  -2.2539***  -1.1384  -2.0485*** 
 (3.07) (4.23) (1.00) (2.17)  (2.23) (5.75) (1.60) (3.17)
Bank Productivity  1.5019***  2.1461***  1.9087**  2.1673***    1.1890*  2.4863***  0.6343  2.2149*** 
 (3.33)  (4.51)  (2.33)  (3.80)    (1.97) (4.61) (0.86) (2.74) 
Bank Capital Growth  0.1351**  0.0380  0.1144*  0.0685    0.1574*  -0.0005  0.1951*  0.0166 
 (2.54)  (1.22)  (1.86)  (1.64)    (1.81) (0.01) (1.70) (0.34) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Assets  -0.1181  -0.0258  -1.9846*  -0.2338    0.1365 -0.1858 -1.2829 -0.9830 
 (0.11)  (0.04)  (1.97)  (0.12)    (0.14) (0.28) (1.20) (0.79) 
               
Region-by-Time-Fixed  Effects  YES  YES  YES YES    YES YES YES YES 
Bank  Fixed  Effects  NO  NO  NO NO    NO NO NO NO 
Clustering  by  Bank  YES  YES  YES YES    YES YES YES YES 
               
Observations  900  910  450 460    930 880 460 470 
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Panel B: Separating Business and Personal Loan Growth   
        
  Business Loan Growth Personal Loan Growth
   (1) (2) (3)  (4)
       
Deposit Growth  0.1928***  0.1861***  0.1120***  0.0516** 
 (3.30) (3.00) (4.64)  (2.34)
Influence 0.1778    -0.0815   
 (0.52)    (0.38)   
Deposit Growth * Influence  -0.1098**  -0.1170***  -0.0610***  -0.0270* 
 (2.56)  (2.67)  (3.66)  (1.88) 
Bank Capital Growth  0.0521*  0.0822**  0.0184*  0.0046 
 (1.83)  (2.41)  (1.89)  (0.41) 
Log(Total Assets)  -0.0144  1.9331  -0.1589  2.3697** 
 (0.07)  (0.72)  (1.21)  (2.02) 
Solvency -1.5667***  -4.9836***  -1.2501***  -2.1605*** 
 (4.37)  (3.58)  (5.51)  (3.27) 
Bank Productivity  2.9270***  2.9272*  1.4069***  0.3086 
 (5.44)  (1.88)  (4.59)  (0.64) 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Assets  -0.2956  0.0944  -0.0649  -0.4378 
 (0.39)  (0.11)  (0.19)  (1.20) 
        
Region-by-Time-Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Bank and Time Fixed Effects  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Clustering by Bank  YES  YES  YES  YES 
        
Observations  1810  1810 1810 1810 
R-squared  0.195  0.168 0.208 0.178 
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Figure 1: Overview of Empirical Predictions 
      
This figure provides an overview of the empirical predictions of the ‘information asymmetry’ and ‘empire building’ 
hypothesis. We expect the differences in the empirical predictions between the two hypotheses to be greater when 
information asymmetry between the headquarters and the banks is greater (smaller), as influence may be more (less) 
relevant in those circumstances.  
      
      Information Asymmetry  
Hypothesis 
Empire Building  
Hypothesis 
 
Funds from  
Headquarters 
    
More influential banks receive more funds from the headquarters 
 
 
Sensitivity of Loan  




More influential banks increase 
their lending less when 
experiencing positive deposit 
growth (i.e., lending is less 
sensitive to the local deposit base) 
More influential banks increase 
their lending more when 
experiencing positive deposit 
growth (i.e., lending is less 
sensitive to the local deposit base) 




More influential banks decrease their lending less when experiencing 
negative deposit growth (i.e., lending is less sensitive to the local 
deposit base) 
 
Figure 2: Time Series of Aggregate Loan and Deposit Growth at the Banking Group Level 
              
This figure shows the time series of deposit and loan growth aggregated at the banking group level. Both variables are 
calculated by aggregating the loans and deposits over all member banks. We observe that at the banking group level 
aggregate loan growth is much more volatile than aggregate deposit growth.   
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Figure 3: Distribution of Voting Rights in the Banking Group 
             
This figure shows the distribution of voting rights in the banking group. Voting rights are constant over time and vary 
across member banks between a minimum of 1 vote and a maximum of 10 votes. The figure shows, for example, that 32% 
of the banks in the sample have 7 votes. The group consists of 181 member banks.    
 










































Figure 4: Distribution of Influence in the Banking Group 
             
Figure 4-A shows the nonlinear relation between member bank size (measured by total assets of a bank) and the number of 
voting rights (left axis). It also shows the relation between member bank size and ownership rights (in %, right axis). 
Figure 4-B plots the relation between the influence variable and bank size. Influence is the share of voting rights of a bank 
divided by the share of ownership rights of a member bank in headquarters. The observations in the figure are based on 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Cash Windfall Quarter (Q2 2007) with All Other Quarters 
             
This figure compares mean values of deposit growth, loan growth, and net funding from headquarters (Net HQ 
Funds/Total Assets) between the cash windfall quarter of Q2 2007 and all other quarters of the sample period. Deposit 
growth is significantly different at 1%, Loan growth at 5%, and Net HQ Funds is not statistically different. In Q2 2007 the 
banks in the banking group experienced major cash inflows as a result of a foreign takeover of a major rival in the deposit 
market.  
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Appendix A1: Definition of Variables 
  




Total Assets   Total assets of a bank in t (in 1000 Euro)  
Deposits   Total deposits taken by a bank in t from customers (in 1000 EUR) and the sum of current 
account deposits, term deposits and savings deposits 
Loans   Total outstanding loans provided by a bank in t (in 1000 EUR) 
Loan Growth  Growth in loans in period t measured as log of loans in t minus log of loans in t-1, 
multiplied by 100 
Business Loan Growth  Growth in loans to business customers in period t measured as log of loans in t minus log 
of loans in t-1, multiplied by 100 
Personal Loan Growth  Growth in loans to private customers (mainly residential mortgage loans and consumer 
loans)  in period t measured as log of loans in t minus log of loans in t-1, multiplied by 
100 
Funds from HQ  Funds/loans extended by headquarters to a bank in t (in 1000 EUR) 
Deposits at HQ  Money deposited at headquarters by a bank in t (in 1000 EUR)  
Distance to Headquarters  Physical distance between a bank and headquarters, measured in km 
STD Deposit Growth  Standard deviation in deposit growth of a bank (measured over the sample period)  
Net HQ Funds  Difference between Funds from HQ and Deposits at HQ and a measure of the net amount 
of funds extended by headquarters to a bank in t (in 1000 EUR) 
Net Provider of Funds  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a bank is a net provider of funds (i.e. Net Funds 
from HQ<0) in t 
Net Receiver of Funds  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a bank is a net receiver of funds (i.e. Net Funds 
from HQ>=0) in t 
Bank Capital   Equity of a bank in t (in 1000 EUR) 
Bank Productivity  Ratio of total income to total costs in t 
Solvency  Actual capital of a local bank divided by the capital required for banking supervision 
purposes in t 
Loan Loss Provisions  Loan loss provisions in t (in 1000 EUR) 
ROE    Return on equity in t and measured as net income over equity (in %) 
ROA  Return on assets in t defined as net operating income over total assets (in %) 
Influence  Measures the influence of a bank in the organization and defined as the ratio of a bank’s 
share of voting rights divided by its share of ownership rights in headquarters. A member 
bank with more voting rights relative to its ownership rights is perceived as more 
influential because it can bargain for more favors relative to its ownership share. 
Voting Rights   Measures the number of votes in headquarters held by a member bank. The variable 
ranges between 1 and 10.  
Ownership Rights  Measures the number of shares held by a bank in headquarters divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding (number reported in %). 
Average Loan Growth Region  Average loan growth in a region computed for our sample of banks. 
  
Appendix A2: Correlations of Main Variables 
                     
This table provides correlations of the main variables in our data set.                        
                      
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
Deposit  Growth  (in  %)  (1)  1.00                   
Loan  Growth  (in  %)  (2)  0.18  1.00                  
Business  Loan  Growth  (in  %)  (3)  0.08  0.65  1.00                 
Personal Loan Growth (in %)  (4)  0.15  0.63  0.06  1.00                       
Bank Capital Growth (in %)  (5)  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.01  1.00                     
Bank  Productivity  (6) 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.06 1.00                   
Solvency  (7)  -0.07 -0.20 -0.09 -0.21 0.00  0.05  1.00                 
ROE  (in  %)  (8) 0.11 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.75 0.18 1.00               
ROA  (in  %)  (9) -0.11 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.54 0.25 0.55 1.00             
Influence  (10) 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.12 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 1.00           
Ownership Rights (in %)  (11)  -0.03  -0.02  0.01  -0.03  0.00  -0.05  -0.04  0.01  0.02  -0.84  1.00         
Voting  Rights  (12) 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.12 -0.31 0.08 -0.01  -0.61 0.80 1.00       
STD Deposit Growth (in %)  (13)  0.05  0.08  0.08  0.06  -0.10  -0.02  -0.37  -0.09  -0.13  0.17  -0.04  0.13  1.00     
Distance  to  Headquarters  (in  km)  (14) -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.01  0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 0.05 0.04 0.05 1.00   
Net  HQ  Funds/Total  Assets  (15) -0.05 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.29 -0.49 0.01 -0.05 0.25 -0.11 0.20 0.33 0.30 1.00 
 
 